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PROJECT APPRAISAL AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE
CONSTRAINTS*
It is a commonplace that the shadow (or accounting) prices appropriate for use
in project selection in an economy depend on the 'market' imperfections that
are judged to be present. What has received far less attention in the theoretical
literature on social cost-benefit analysis is the fact that they depend as well on
the response of the government to the perturbation which the undertaking of
projects entails. It is convenient to suppose that the government simultaneously
optimises with respect to all variables within its control, and it is the implication
of this supposition that has been explored in much ofthe recent literature on
project evaluation. But as a model of government behaviour it is not persuasive.
Moreover, the analysis of government behaviour becomes critical in situations
where prices and wages are not perfectly flexible.
This paper is concerned with economies in which markets are characterised
by price rigidities and where governments behave systematically, but not
necessarily optimally. In such a world we wish to obtain rules for project selection.
The analysis is conducted in the context of the foreign exchange market. We
shall focus on this, not only because of its importance in developing countries
but also because there is considerable evidence that for one reason or another
there often appears to be an excess demand for foreign exchange in such
economies. Specifically, what we wish to do is to evaluate the meaning of the
idea ofa foreign exchange constraint (as contrasted with 'resource constraints'
in general), together with the notion ofthe shadow price of foreign exchange,
and their connection with the structure of accounting prices of goods and
services involved in investment projects.^
We shall present the analysis in the context ofthe simplest of economies, in
order that some ofthe discussion can be presented in diagrammatic form. Most
ofthe time, for instance, we shall consider what is essentially a single-consumer
economy. Nevertheless, we shall have a multi-consumer economy as a motivation
for the assumptions that are made.^ Moreover, excepting Section I, we will not
consider factor markets or their shadow prices; rather, we will think of projects
as alternative uses of identical factor inputs. We employ this device in order to
develop a methodology for the derivation ofthe accounting prices of produced
commodities.
In Section I, we draw on recent work in the theory of public finance to discuss
• The first version of this paper was issued at the IBRD in April 1976. The views expressed here are
not necessarily those of the World Bank. We are most grateful to Bela Balassa, Jagdish Bhagwati,
John Flemming, Gordon Hughes and David Newbcry for their helpful comments.
' For earlier discussions of this class of problems, see e.g. Little and Mirrlees (1974)1 Dasgupta,
Marglin and Sen (1972), Bacha and Taylor (1971), Balassa (1974), Batra and Guisinger (1974),
Bertrand (1974), and Scott (1974}. A good evaluation of the arguments is in Hughes (1978).
* Mirrlees (1977) has, among other things, extended some ofthe results obtained below lo the case
of a many-consumer economy.
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conditions under which it makes no sense to distinguish between a foreign
exchange constraint and a general resource constraint. In Section II we discuss
the case where al! goods that are produced can be traded with the rest of the
world at fixed border prices. Here, the major issue involves the implications of
border prices differing from market prices. In Section III we shift our attention
to the difference between the ratio of the shadow prices of traded goods to those
of non-traded goods and the ratio of their corresponding market prices. In
Section IV we shall summarise our main conclusions, compare them with some
of those in the earlier literature and also comment on the methodology we have
chosen to pursue here.
I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY
A full-Optimum allocation of resources is, under quite general circumstances,
characterised by overall production efficiency for the economy. If trade pos-
sibilities exist these are included as' production options' .^  But overall production
efficiency also implies that at the margin the social value of foreign exchange is
the same as that of domestic resources.
In order to realise a full-optimum a government would need to be able to
implement optimal lump sum transfers. Suppose that this is not feasible. Dis-
torting taxes are then a device by which the government can hope to increase
social welfare. Suppose now that there are no constraints on the extent to which
commodities can be taxed. It is then possible to show that under fairly general
circumstances a second-best optimum is characterised again by overall pro-
duction efficiency.2 While at such an optimum the value of domestic consump-
tion measured in consumer prices diflfers in generai from the value of domestic
production, measured in producer prices, overall production efficiency implies that
at the margin the social value of foreign exchange is the same as that of domestic
resources. Again, one concludes that at a second-best optimum of this kind it
is not meaningful to distinguish between a foreign exchange constraint and a
general resource constraint.
Overall production efficiency for a small trading economy implies that
accounting prices are the same as the prices faced by domestic private producers,
and that in particular, accounting prices for tradeables equal their border
prices. However, the existence of widespread concern about foreign exchange
suggests that there is more to the notion ofa foreign exchange constraint than the
above literature would suggest.^
What we propose to do in the remainder of this paper is to derive criteria for
social benefit-cost analysis in open economies that do not aspire to the second-
best optima discussed above. We study an economy in ' equilibrium' in which
the government has not adopted a fully optimal course of action. A small project
' It is most convenient to suppose trade to be controlled by the government, and we shall often
stippose this to be so.
' See Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
^ There is another notion of foreign exchange constraint which arises in the context of a country
facing a demand for its exporu whieh is not perfectly elastic. This is a transformation constraint, made
familiar by trade theorists.
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is contemplated, and the economy is assumed to find a new resting place. To
calculate the appropriate shadow prices with which to evaluate the project we
compare this new ' equilibrium' with the old.
II. TRADED GOODS
II .! . The Problem
In Fig. I we have drawn the production possibility schedule between two
produced commodities (/ and E), which are assumed to be traded freely on the
world market. The undistorted market equilibrium production point is given
by Q, the point of tangency between the production possibility schedule and
the international price line. The consumption point of this economy is given by
Fig. I
C, the point of tangency between the indifference curve of the representative
individual and the budget line, AA. The trade vector is CQ. In such an economy
it makes no sense to talk ofa foreign exchange constraint (or bottleneck). Rather,
the economy faces general resource constraints. Since the exchange rate itself
does not affect relative prices, it has no effect on resource allocation and serves
merely as an arbitrary scaling parameter.
As regards project evaluation, the rule is clear: a project should be accepted
if and only if it is profitable at border prices 77' and P^. Since in fact Q is the
optimum, all other feasible projects will yield negative profits when evaluated at
border prices. To put it differently, suppose Q' is the contemplated production
point and C the consumption point. Consider a feasible project which consists
iu moving from Q' to Q. The project uses E (of amount AE) to produce / (of
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amount A/). The'real value' of the project is/*}''A/-P^ |A£|. Itis, as the figure
makes clear, positive. Welfare is increased by project acceptance, as the con-
sumption point moves from C to C.
Now consider what happens if the domestic price ratio differs from the
international price ratio. In what follows we shall thoughout suppose that the
domestic price of exports (E) relative to imports (7) is greater than the inter-
national price ratio. In such a situation domestic producers will be induced to
produce less of / and more of E. The production point is then represented by
Q" in Fig. 2, which is to the south-east ofthe undistorted production point Q.
I"
Fig. 2
If no taxes were to be imposed on consumers they would believe that they could
trade along the budget line BB (whose slope gives the domestic price ratio of
the two goods) and would choose consumption point C, as Fig. 2 makes clear.
Thus, their' equilibrium' supply of exports would be given by E*~C%, and their
demand for imports by Cf~I* (see Fig. 2). Unfortunately, although they believe
they can trade along BB, the true trading possibilities for the economy as a
whole are given by AA, a line through Q " with a slope equal to the border price
ratio, which represents the value of production in terms of foreign exchange.
Thus the distance Cf-G* represents the trade gap - the excess demand for
imports - at the perceived market prices, which cannot be met by trading with
foreigners (see Fig. 2). It is because of this perceived excess demand for imports -
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to which government policy is directed - that governments become very con-
scious ofa foreign exchange 'constraint'. However, the origin of this sort of
disequilibrium is not the foreign exchange market but the domestic price
distortion.
Given that a 'wrong' set of domestic relative prices may manifest itself as a
foreign exchange problem, the next question is - given this gap, how is the
economy to equilibrate? One way is to suppose that the exce.ss demand for
imports leads to an increase in its price relative to exports, until equilibrium is
attained with the domestic price ratio equal to the border price ratio. This is.
Income-consumption path
Fig. 3
of course, the first-best solution and merely begs the issue. There are reasons
why a government may not or cannot allow this to happen. For whatever
reason, however, we assume the price ratios do not equilibrate (or that market
forces, even if they work, do so slowly). There are indeed many equilibrating
mechanisms that a government may follow. For the purpose of illustration we
shall, in what follows, consider four such mechanisms.
{a) The government can reduce demand by imposing a lump-sum (or income)
tax. The equilibrium consumption point is at the point where the income-
expenditure curve intersects the balance of payments equilibrium line (such as
point C" in Fig. 3).
{b) The government can reduce demand for the imported good by taxing
consumption of that good directly. The equilibrium consumption point would
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then be the intersection ofthe price-consumption curve and the foreign exchange
budget line (such as point C"" in Fig. 4).
[c] The government can ration the imports; for example by imposing a surtax
on consumption above a certain level. This converts the linear budget line BB
into a non-linear locus, with the equilibrium consumption point being on the
true trade possibilities line AA. By varying the surtax, any point on AA can be
obtained^ (see Fig. 2).
[d) The economy can borrow the required foreign exchange to finance the
deficit. This, of course, simply means a postponement ofthe problem: at some
B.M'
Fig. 4
later date, imports will have to be decreased or exports increased. This may
make sense, if it is believed that whatever the constraints are which prevent
the current price ratios fi'om adjusting to clear the foreign exchange market
will not be binding at some future date. This raises interesting problems, the
analysis ofwhich requires an intertemporal model.
For each of these methods of adjusting to the disequilibrium induced by
incorrect domestic prices, we can calculate the social value of a project. A
project in our problem can be viewed as a small shift in production around the
point Q" in Figs. 2-4. The question is this: what is the effect of any particular
perturbation, taking into account the demand for imports, the supply of exports
' This is equivalent to the government controlling most foreign exchange transactions, but there
being a black market as well.
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and the government's reactions to any change in the gap between exports and
imports?
It will have been noted that there are two basic categories of situations that
one needs to consider. In some circumstances, in the new equilibrium consumer
prices are the same as the old consumer prices. Whether a project increases or
decreases welfare can be evaluated simply in terms of its effect on ' net' income
(after taxes) measured in consumer prices. But since taxes have to be adjusted
so that the foreign exchange market clears, provided only that there is a positive
marginal propensity to consume imports, any increase in real 'net ' income (at
fixed consumer prices) must correspond to an increase in real income (before
taxes) evaluated at border prices, and we can use border prices to evaluate
projects (see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1974)).
But if consumer prices are changed, the above argument does not hold.
One can construct examples where a bad project looks good if evaluated at
consumer prices and also examples where a bad project looks good if evaluated
at border prices. The exact formula for the accounting prices will depend on the
way in which the economy is equilibrated. In particular, accounting prices will
not equal border prices, since the consumption distortion changes with the
project in question. For an analysis of this in a more general context, see Das-
gupta and Stiglitz (1974).
Before undertaking the relevant calculations it is as well to introduce some of
the notation we shall consistently be using: X^ = domestic production of i
(i = I,E); Ci = consumption off; Y^ = value of total consumption at domestic
prices; Pf = domestic price of z; P^ = PI/PEI ^T = border (international) price
ofi; P"" = Pf/Ps; y" = value of consumption at border prices; and lV{Cf,Cj^)
the community's social welfare function. Further notation will be introduced
when necessary.
II .2. Income Taxation as the Equilibrating Device
This is the simplest case to analyse. Referring to Fig. 3, Q" is the production
point and BB represents its value at domestic prices. The economy as a whole
equilibrate^ at consumption point C", which is on the foreign exchange budget
line A'A', and which measures the value of production at the border price ratio.
MM represents the level of consumer income required for equilibrium if con-
sumers trade at domestic prices. Hence, the slope of A/A/ is the same as the slope
of BB and the distance between the two is the amount of income taxation
required.^ A new equilibrium, with production slightly different from Q'\ will
increase welfare only if it allows MAI to shift out. Since MAI is determined by
the level of income at world prices, A'A', the new equilibrium represents a
higher level of utility only if the new production point lies above A'A'. Thus, the
accounting price ratio for project appraisal is the international price ratio. The
standard recommendation that traded goods be revalued to reflect their border
prices can be seen as a logical consequence of assuming that at the margin
' The two slopes need not be identical; they would differ if there were differential consumption
taxes on the two goods.
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excess demand for imports is met by income taxation (and not by borrowing or
price changes, as the analysis in sections II.3 and 11.5 will make clear).
It will be useful to present a formal analysis of this. A project is a perturbation
in production, represented by the vector {dXf, dXf^). Our problem is to relate
[dXj, dXp) to a change in welfare, dW. Clearly,
dW = fi{PfdCr+PUCE)y CO
where//is the marginalsocialutility of (aggregate) domestic consumption. Now,
by definition
Y'' = P1CJ^P%CE{^ PjXj^PiX^) (2)
and
F- = PfC,^PlCE{=PfXj + P^X^). (3)
Define a = PfdCj/dY'^. It follows immediately that
where /? is the marginal rate of exchange of foreign currency for domestic
currency at the equilibrium in question. Now use equation (4) and the dif-
ferential of Y^ from (3) in (i) to obtain
dX^), (5)
from which we conclude that the ratio of the shadow prices of I and E is the border
price ratio Pf/P^^^, and the exchange rate is irrelevant for project appraisal.
We can still ask whether or not it is reasonable to say that the existing rate
is overvalued at the margin. We can define the existing exchange rate as
b = Y^/Y^', which on using {3) can be expressed as
Dd
[aP^-h{i-a)P'']PT "^^
where a = PfCj/Y'^ is the average share of domestic income spent on the con-
sumption of/. Using (4) and (6) yields
The existing exchange rate is overvalued if/5/i > i. Since we have assumed
pd ^ p»^^ (.j^ g average share of imports must exceed the marginal share, i.e.
a > Oi, for there to be an overvalued exchange rate. But if a ^ a then (i = b.
Thus the shadow exchange rate, /?, equals the existing exchange rate b, if either
(i) P^ = P'"\ or {ii)a. = a (i.e. all income elasticities of demand equal unity). For
the exchange rate to be overvalued (a case of particular interest), not only must
both [i) and {ii) be violated but also the income elasticity of demand for the
protected good (in this case, exports) must be greater than unity (i.e. a > ex.).
11.3. Commodity Taxation as an Equilibrating Device
In the previous section it was supposed that relative prices were not affected
by the project's implementation. We are now concerned with the case in which
the government varies the consumption tax on imports to maintain equilibrium
S ECS 91
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(see Fig. 4). In addition to the symbols introduced earlier we need the following:
Pi = consumer price of i {i = lyE); Pf = producer price of i\ P^ =
the price elasticity of demand for the imported commodity.
Assuming that initially an equilibrium exists we note that instead of equation
(2) we now have
Y^ = PfXj + Pl:XE = PiCj^PhCs. (8)
However, equation (3) continues to hold. We wish to compute dW, where dW
is given by equation (i).
By normalisation dP^^ = 0. Moreover, from the definition ofa (now defined
as P^i dCjJdY^) and e we have
Taking the differentials of (8) and (3) one notes that




We can now substitute (10) and (11) in (i) (with/^f,/^^ for/*?,P|) to obtain





Equation (12), as it stands, is still not useful. In order to obtain the rule for
project appraisal, substitute the differentials of (3) and (8) in (12) to obtain
dW = [dPf + (l>Pf) dXj + [dPl, + <^Pl) dX^;
from which we conclude that the shadow price of imports relative to that of exports,
P^, is given by the expression
_ (e-g)
{e-
By assumption P^ > P^ > P'^ (see Fig. 4). I t is simple to confirm that if the
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two goods are gross-substitutes then e —a > o, which on using (13) implies that
P^ > P^ > P^.^ In this case the accounting price ratio lies between the inter-
national price ratio and the domestic producer price ratio.
11.4. Rationing
Governments often resort to rationing to cope with disequilibria in the foreign
exchange market. Return once again to Fig. 2. By hypothesis P^ < P^". The
idea now consists in the government allowing the consumer to trade freely at
the price ratio P^ up to a maximum consumption of / given by the level of
domestic production /* . On looking at Fig. 2 it is clear that this means that
equilibrium consumption is at Q", There is no trade at this equilibrium; thus
Cj = Xj^ / * and Cg = X^ = E*. More formally, (/*,£*) is the welfare-
maximising consumption point when the consumer chooses {Cj,C}^) subject to
the constraints
PjCj^P^C,,^ Y^ = PU*+PEE* (14)
and
C, < / * . (15)
Let ijf and v be the multipliers associated with constraints (14) and (15). It
follows immediately that a perturbation in consumption at (/*,.£*) yields a
welfare change given by
dW = [fPj + v) dCj + fPl: dCj,. (16)
Glearly also, if production is perturbed at (I*,E*) we shall have dCj = dXj
and dCg = dX^- It follows immediately from (16) that in this case
ps _ pd , ^ - ^ pd
In fact, from Fig. 2 it is clear that P^ > P"^ > P^.
We conclude that under a rationing scheme the shadow price of imports relative to that
of exports, f", exceeds both the world price ratio and the domestic price ratio.
Equation (16) makes clear that for the problem at hand one wants to calculate
the consumer's 'willingness to pay' at the rationed equilibrium. The key
problem in this lies in estimating v/^, which measures the extent to which
realised consumption, /*, falls short of that which is desired at the price ratio
P^. For the model we have been studying this is a simple enough matter. For
more general economies estimating these is problematic. For a general discussion
of this, see Little and Mirrlees (1974, pp. 167-9).
11.5. Foreign Borrowing as an Equilibrating Mechanism
A full intertemporal analysis, which this case ideally demands, would take us
beyond the scope of this paper. What we shall do here is to consider a simpler
problem, where the project engenders a balance of payments deficit in the
current year, which is repaid in the future. The deficit, in the meanwhile, is
' If the two goods are gross-substitutes, the own price elasticity (c) of / must exceed in absolute
terms its income elasticity. But by definition the latter is a/a > a. (Since a < i.)
3-a
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financed by foreign borrowing. We establish the result that if and only if foreign
borrowing is currently at its optimal level should accounting prices equal international prices.
To see this, we divide the effects ofa project into two components: its impact
on current welfare (as measured by change in 7''), and the opportunity cost of
any induced changes in foreign borrowing. Thus having, by normalisation, set
fl = I, we have
dW = dY^-XdE, (17)
where tfF represents the increased foreign borrowing (or reserve reduction) and
A is the marginal value of foreign borrowing in terms of domestic income (the
shadow price of foreign borrowing). Leaving aside the problem of calculating
A, we are interested in determining how the project affects Y^ and F.
Since, by hypothesis, excess demand for imports is met at the margin by
borrowing (increasing F), we have on using equation (2) that
dV^ = Pf dXi + Pi dX,. = Pj dC, + Pi dCj,. {18)
Now the increase in borrowing induced by the project is the foreign exchange
costs of the additional expenditure minus the foreign exchange earned by the
project. Thus,
dF = Pf{dCj - dXj) + P^CE - dX^). (19)
Next define the 'consumption conversion factor', ^ , by the expression
</>{PrdCj+p^dCj,) = pfdCj+pidc^. (20)
</> is the marginal cost of foreign exchange in terms of domestic income. Now use
(i8)~(2o) in (17} to obtain the total effect ofthe project on welfare as
X,:, (21)
from which we conclude that the accounting price ratio of imports and exports,
(22)
Equation (22) says that the accounting prices for the two tradeables are not their
border prices if there is a divergence between the marginal cost {1/^), and the marginal
value ( i /A), of domestic income in terms of foreign exchange. In particular, we note
that P^ = P^' if and only if A = 0; i.e. the government has optimised its level of
borrowing in the presence ofthe divergence between domestic and international
prices. Note as well that the relative shadow price ofthe protected good is less
than the existing domestic price. If too much is being borrowed (i.e. A > <p),
the shadow price ofthe protected good must be reduced below even world price
levels (i.e. P^ > /*"' > P'^).
Since additional foreign borrowing must be repaid in future years, its cost
represents the discounted value of future income used for repayment. Thus a
fully dynamic model must be used to calculate A. Here we shall not go into this
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issue. For an analysis of one such dynamic model, see Blitzer, Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1976).
III. NON-TRADED GOODS
The addition of non-traded goods complicates the analysis considerably. In the
first place, we can no longer assume that all relative prices are determined by
tariffs and consumers' taxes in conjunction with fixed border prices. Either the
exchange rate or the prices of non-traded goods will usually shift as the production
vector changes.
Second, we must make explicit our assumptions regarding production
decisions. With fixed indirect taxes and all goods traded, private sector pro-
duction is not affected by public sector production decisions, since they depend
on producers' prices only. When a non-traded good is introduced, public sector
production may affect producers' prices and hence private sector production
decisions.
As in the previous discussion, the welfare impact ofa project depends on the
manner in which the government chooses to close any gaps caused by a sub-
optimal tax system. For example, consider an economy which has three goods -
two of which are traded, and one that is non-tradeable. Since an additional
market (for non-traded goods) must be kept in equilibrium, public finance
involves using more instruments. It follows that the number of possible cases
that one may study here is much greater than that in the previous section.
In what follows we will consider the case where the government maintains
equilibrium through changes in the consumers' price of the non-traded good.
For simplicity, we assume that public investment decisions do not affect private
sector production choices. This implies that relative producers' prices are fixed.
Alternatively, one can envisage that all production is under direct government
control.
In addition to the symbols defined in Section II, we make use ofthe following
notation:
Xy = production ofthe non-traded good;
Cjv = consumption ofthe non-traded good;
P!^ = producers' price ofthe non-traded good;
Pfi, = consumers' price ofthe non-traded good;
ii = total indirect tax rate on good ;, i = / , E;
ti = tariff rate on good ;, i = I,E;
Ti = consumption tax on good i {i = I^E, N).
Assuming that initially an equilibrium exists, we have
Y^ = PfXr + PiX^ + P^X^ = PjCr + PiCj, + P'^ C^. (23)
Moreover, for ' balance of payments' equilibrium to hold,
r - ^ p^'Xj+p^x^ = PfCj+p^^c^. (24)
Finally, the market for the non-traded good must clear. This means that
X^. = Cy. (25)
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Consumption of each good depends on consumers' prices and disposable
income. Thus
Ci = C,{PhP%,P%,Y^), for i = I,E,N. (26)
Now consider a small project which can be abbreviated as {dXf, dX^, dXj^). We
want to consider its impact on welfare. By hypothesis consumer prices reflect
'willingness to pay'. Since only the sign ofthe welfare change matters we write
(normalising ft at unity)
dW = PfdCj + P%dCj, + P%dC,^^. {27)
As earlier, we need to express dlVa.s a linear combination ofdXj, dXj^ and dX>^.
By differentiating equation (23) and substituting into (27), we have
dW = dY^-C^-dP% (28)
(since our hypothesis regarding government policy implies dPj = dP^ = o). We
wish to calculate the efFect ofthe project on Y'^ and P^,. Taking tlie differentials
of (23) and (26), one obtains
dCy (29)
and using (24) and (26)
dY^^ddY^ + EdP^, (30)
where
Equations (29) and (30) can then be solved for dY^ and dP^ as functions of
dY"^ and dC.^. Then, using (28), it follows that dW is proportional to dW*,
where
^^±^ X^.^ (31)
While equation (31) yields the accounting prices that we need to estimate, it
does not express them in an intuitive form. The troublesome bit is the factor,
{aC_y + b)/{dCy + h^), which needs to be expressed in terms of initial conditions
(i.e. the equilibrium point) and the more familiar price and income elasticities.
Towards this we may as well normalise and set Pf = P^= i. Now let q denote
the nominal exchange rate {q units of domestic currency per unit of foreign
exchange). Then Pf = q{i +ti) and P^ = (i +Ti)Pf = g{i +1^), for i = I,E
Now define
p% ac, ^ . , ^
and let a ^ denote the marginal consumption share of the non-traded good.
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Simple manipulation of equation (31) then reduces it to the form
dw* = q[i +7ij + {j-r)i,^{dX, + dX^) +nrfX,v, (32)
where
Ci{°^NVi + eix) 1
Q (a ^ • VI + e/ ,v) + CK (a ^ v VE + ^E .V) *
Equation (32) is the key result of this section, because we can now conclude:
(i) The ratio of the shadow price of I to that of E equals their border price ratio {unity),
and
{ii) in pricing traded goods relative to the non-traded good a shadow exchange rate
{SER) must be used. The SER is the nominal rate times one plus a weighted average of total
indirect taxes, ij and t^. The weights depend on demand elasticities and initial conditions.
It is the first part {i) that requires comment, since it seemingly runs counter
to the result in Section II.3. But the point is that here we have not allowed
any adjustments in the relative prices of the traded goods in the description of
the government's equilibrating mechanism. If we allowed the government to
equilibrate, say by taxing imports only, then as in Section II.3 the first part of
the foregoing result would not hold. This would be the case as well were the
government to resort to foreign borrowing to close the trade deficit.
IV. COMMENTARY
In these concluding remarks, we shall clarify some ofthe differences between
the approach we have taken and that of others. Methodologically, our study
differs somewhat from that which is now prevalent in the modern public finance
literature, which is to obtain rules for taxation and criteria for public production
from conditions the (possibly second-best) optimum must satisfy (i.e. the first-
order conditions) .2
Instead we have studied an economy in equilibrium in which the govern-
ment has not adopted .an optimal course of action. In this economy a small
project is contemplated. The economy is assumed to find a new resting place,
and the problem is to calculate the accounting prices with which to evaluate the
project.^ Stated so baldly the approach is uncontroversial. Controversies usually
arise when precise assumptions are made about the government's sub-optimal
policies; or, in the terminology of this paper, the equilibrating mechanisms that
the government pursues. Here we have not been concerned with evaluating the
relative merits of one over the others, but ratber with studying the implications
ofa few such mechanisms on project choice. To an extent this has enabled us to
trace the structure ofthe shadow prices to the equilibrating mechanism. In this
^ Note that a^j Vi + ^ iN is the general equilibrium, or compensated price elasticity of good i. It
should be noted also that equation (32) is a special form of an expression developed by Harberger
(1971) and Balassa (1974) for the shadow price of non-tradeables. It is a special case because we have
supposed government action not afTectiiig relative producers' prices. Moreover, we have assumed that
the exchange rate is held constant.
' See, for example, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1974).
' The relationship between these two approaches is clear enough. For a more complete discussion
of these matters, see Daagupta (1978) and Hughes (1978).
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sense this paper is complementary to Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1974), for in the
earlier paper no particular attention was given to the nature of the equilibrating
mechanism the government was assumed to follow.
The results of this paper force one to reject approaches that propose shadow
prices based on the desire for free trade as a final resting place. The point is not
whether free trade is desirable, but rather that shadow prices - if they are to
be meaningful - must be calculated on the basis of a clear recognition of the
actual (possibly sub-optimal) policy being pursued.
At issue is the distinction between a foreign exchange constraint, the shadow
price of foreign exchange, and the accounting prices of the different goods and
services involved in an investment project. Stated loosely the multi-sector
programming approach to development planning (as in, e.g. Blitzer, Clark and
Taylor (1975)) views tbe shadow price of foreign exchange as the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the constraint reflecting the balance of payments. For
our purpose this is not of great help since the focus of attention in this paper
has been the study of equilibria that may be quite sub-optimal. For example,
we noted in Section II that it is possible that there is a wedge between the social
value of foreign exchange, A, and its social cost ^. For project planning the
need is to obtain the relative shadow prices of all the goods and services, in
the calculation ofwhich <j> and A may or may not play an important role. There
are circumstances (e.g. as in Section II.5, when foreign borrowing is optimal,
and 0 = A), where the shadow price of foreign exchange is of no interest (see
equation (22)). Then again, it was noted that if ^ 4= A, the precise values of
<f> and A are required to obtain the relative shadow prices of goods and services
(equation (22)).
If all goods and services are traded the nominal exchange rate is immaterial.
Relative shadow prices are independent of the exchange rate. If the nominal
exchange rate is altered by a given proportion, each of the 'prices', Pf, /*£,
A and 0 is altered by the same proportion and, as (22} makes clear, P'* remains
the same.
Matters are different when non-traded goods are introduced into the picture.
The nominal exchange rate influences the prices of non-traded goods as a
whole relative to the prices of traded ones. Now suppose, for simplicity, that the
circumstances are such that the appropriate accounting prices of traded goods
are their international prices (as in the example of Section III). What remains
is to calculate the shadow prices ofthe non-traded goods relative to any one of
these traded goods. The nominal exchange rate [q) will now clearly matter.
But the accounting prices of non-traded goods may not equal their market prices.
A different factor is then required to convert the market price of each non-traded
good to its shadow price. For this reason it is often said that one needs to calculate
as many shadow exchange rates as there are non-traded goods (see, e.g. Scott
(1974)). In the example of Section II a single non-traded good was postulated,
and therefore only a single shadow exchange rate {SER) is required. It is defined
in equation (32) as the factor ^fi+y^/+ (i —y)'"^;]. This is the terminology
followed in Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972), Balassa(i974) and Bruno (1976).
An equivalent approach would be to measure values in foreign currency.
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Since it is only the sign oi^ dW* in equation (32) that matters we could as
well divide both sides of (32) by the SER to obtain
Here, the factor converting the market price ofthe non-traded good (expressed
in foreign currency), Py/q, to its shadow price is i /[i +y '^/ + (i — y ) ^ - It is
this last term that is often referred to as the conversion factor for the non-traded
good.^ In general, a separate conversion factor is required for each non-traded
good. But this can be very hard work. Both Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972)
and Balassa (1974) have therefore suggested formulae for calculating the
shadow prices of non-tradeables, as a group, in terms of tradeables, by using a
single shadow exchange rate. In the language of Little and Mirrlees (1969;
1974), this is equivalent to using a single conversion factor (the standard con-
version factor) to transform the market price of every non-traded good into its
shadow price. This is, of course, a crude approximation, since it supposes that the
relative shadow prices of non-tradeables are equal to their relative market prices.^
In a sense the results of this paper are depressing, for they suggest that very
general results are hard to come by in the field of cost-benefit analysis: accounting
prices of goods and services appear not to be insensitive to the equilibrating
mechanisms that are pursued by a government. However, the models we have
chosen to study here are mere examples; nothing more. We have chosen to work
with tbem not only for tbe purpose of illustrating a methodology for social
cost-benefit analysis, but also to highlight the fact that what appears as a ' foreign
exchange constraint' often arises because of domestic price distortions. However,
several ofthe specific results in this paper may appear at variance with recom-
mendations in earlier works on the subject of social cost-benefit analysis. The
procedure we have pursued in this paper consists in expressing the change in
social welfare, dW, due to a project solely as a weighted sum of the goods and
services involved in the project, dX^ [i = I,E, N). The shadow prices are then
these weights (see e.g. equations (21) and (32)). Therefore, for example, in
Section II.5 we concluded that the border prices of tradeables are not their
accounting prices if the government has not sub-optimised the level of foreign
borrowing (equation (22)). However, if we use equations (17)^(20) we can,
equivalently, express rflK in equation (21) as
dW = ^{PfdX.-^-P^dX^) - (A - 0) dF, (33)
and claim that the appropriate accounting price ratio is the border price ratio,
but that in evaluating a project the foreign borrowing engendered by the
project must in addition be taken into account by the use ofa conversion factor
(A — ^) . Thus, if we express —dFa.s the change in government revenue, equation
(33) requires of us to use (^ — A) as a conversion factor for the social cost of extra
government revenue.^ The point, of course, is that unlike equation (21), dWm
* See Little and Mirrlees (1969; 1974).
* The supposition is of course correct if, as in the economies discussed in Section I, overall production
efficiency is desired. It is an open question if the supposition is correct under more generai circumstanres.
' For the example at hand ihc Little and Mirrlees procedure would recommend an appeal lo
equation (33) rather than the equivalent expression (21). See Hughes (1978) for an excellent discussion
of the different approaches.
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equation (33) has not been expressed solely as a weighted sum ofthe goods and
services involved in the project in question. At a formal level it makes no dif-
ference whether one uses expression (21) or expression (33). But at the practical
level it may matter greatly, for it is always possible to express the change in
social welfare as a weighted sum ofthe tradeable inputs and outputs ofa project
(with the relative weights equal to their relative border prices), and the sum
ofa set of residual terms- as in equation (33). Unless the residual terms add up
to zero - as in equation (33) when A = ^ - it is surely misleading to say thai
border prices are the appropriate prices to use in measuring the social values of
tradeable goods and services. It bestows on the 'border price rule' a degree of
generality that it does not in fact possess. In particular there is the inevitable
temptation for the project evaluator to suppose that the residual terms arr
negligible, and to use the border price rule in its unbridled form.
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